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This article, originally published at www.roubini.com on 7 February 2010, spells out 
our two-currency EMU proposal as a plan of last resort for resolving the present EMU 
sovereign-debt crisis. The key ingredients of our proposal involve a temporary split of 
the euro into two currencies, both run by the European Central Bank. The hard euro 
will be maintained by the core-EMU members whereas periphery EMU countries will 
adopt for a suitable period of time the weak euro. All existing debts will continue to 
be denominated in strong-euro terms. The plan involves a one-off devaluation of the 
weak euro versus the strong one, simultaneously with the introduction of far-reaching 
reforms and rapid fiscal consolidation in the periphery EMU countries. We argue that 
due to enhanced market credibility, our two-tier euro plan has a realistic chance of 
success in resolving the EMU crisis, if all other approaches fail.  
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First, we would like to clarify that we are strong supporters of the European monetary 
integration project. Our view is that the single currency involves significant potential 
economic and political benefits for all its participants which far outweigh its potential 
costs. We thus believe it is right to spare no effort to ensure the euro’s continued 
stability and success.  
 
Having said so, however, we cannot but admit that we are currently faced with hard 
facts that cannot be ignored by Europe’s policy-makers. The present turmoil in the 
Greek sovereign bonds market, as well as the increasing pressure on Spanish and 
Portuguese bonds, is not coincidental but symptomatic of a fundamental truth. This is 
that the eurozone is not an optimum currency area. A significant body of academic 
research shows that since euro’s introduction in 1999 the EMU periphery countries 
not only did not achieve real convergence towards the union’s core countries but, on 
the contrary, have diverged further. Euro-participation provided periphery countries 
with a false sense of financial security preventing them from pursuing unpopular yet 
necessary fiscal and structural reforms. This caused substantial competitiveness losses 
leading to unsustainable public and external debts. One can write pages to analyse the 
latter’s implications but the main point is simple. Debts provide the lender claims to 
future consumption the honouring of which implies either higher production or 
reduction of future consumption on behalf of the borrower. The increasingly loud 
market signal we receive in recent months is that the intra-EMU economic divergence 
has been allowed to reach such an extent as to render the servicing of existing debts 
from both sources quoted above increasingly unrealistic. To ignore this signal and 
blame the crisis on speculative attacks is to delude ourselves. What we observe is 
markets responding to unfavourable economic fundamentals rendering the euro’s 
continued existence increasingly unsustainable.  
 
Handling the crisis is not a straightforward proposition. Any successful solution must 
meet four prerequisites. First, preserve the credibility of the EMU as a low-inflation 
area and the euro as a strong currency. Second avoid intra-EMU tensions by 
benefiting one set of European taxpayers at the expense of others. Third, be regarded 
as credible by the markets. Last, but not least, allow the countries under pressure a 
realistic chance of completing successfully necessary structural reforms. This bill is 
hard to fit. Any plan based on an EU-based bail-out would validate long-standing 
moral-hazard fears and undermine euro’s credibility. This is unacceptable to the core-
EMU countries and would stretch the tolerance of their electorates to breaking point. 
Involving the IMF circumvents the fiscal spill-over problem but will signal weakness 
on behalf of the EMU to put its house in order. The risk of a weakened euro is hence 
not eliminated. Finally, allowing national defaults is inconceivable for two reasons. 
First, defaults will leave the credibility of euro-participation of the default countries in 
tatters. Second, they will cause substantial capital losses for many European banks 
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and institutional investors with large investments in the bonds markets of periphery 
countries. By jeopardising the fragile European economic recovery, defaults at the 
periphery will cause EMU-wide costs the core countries can scarcely afford.  
 
This leaves bold fiscal consolidation and far-reaching structural reforms in the 
periphery as the only way out. We totally support this course of action and sincerely 
hope it will be successful. There are good reasons, however, to regard its success as 
not entirely guaranteed. The problem with reforms is that they cause upfront output 
losses with potentially large welfare costs while their (undoubtedly higher) benefits 
follow later. This is why reforms are typically pursued gradually, allowing a 
reasonable margin of adjustment. But the enormity of the imbalances at the periphery 
economies makes the reforms’ extensive and rapid implementation imperative to 
affect market expectations. This element of urgency and thoroughness raises doubts 
about the capacity of the periphery societies to bear the temporary yet substantial fall 
in living standards accompanying the necessary reforms. Hence, in the absence of a 
monetary competitiveness push, a reforms-based strategy may suffer from a deficit of 
credibility. This could compromise its success prospects and leave the EMU exposed 
to the same sustainability risks faced currently. As a result, we believe that in addition 
to determination for promoting reforms, the EMU also needs a self-preserving plan to 
be used if, and only if, everything else fails.  
 
The plan we propose involves the temporary implementation of a two-currency EMU, 
with both currencies run by the Frankfurt-based ECB. The core-EMU countries will 
continue to use the present currency, the strong euro. The periphery countries on the 
other hand, will adopt, for a certain period of time, another currency, the weak euro. 
Crucially, the bonds and external debt of the periphery countries will stay in strong-
euro terms. Upon its introduction, the ECB will devalue the weak euro by a 
percentage enough to restore the competitiveness losses periphery countries have 
suffered over the last decade against their main trading partners, the core-EMU 
countries. This will give the periphery a competitiveness boost while it introduces 
extensive structural reforms. The ECB will implement monetary policy for the whole 
of the EMU with its primary objective being price stability for all its members, 
strong- and weak-euro countries. It will do so in much the same way it does now, the 
only difference being that the ECB will be setting two rather than one reference rates. 
Periphery countries will be able to join the strong euro when they have achieved 
sustainable real convergence allowing them to co-exist with the core-EMU countries 
without fear of the present competitiveness divergence. To ensure this we propose 
that in addition to meeting the current criteria of nominal convergence, transition from 
the weak to the strong euro to be made conditional upon meeting a suitably defined 
criterion referring to the current account balance, a more accurate indicator of long-
term competitiveness developments. A major benefit of the proposed plan is its 
enhanced ability to provide an effective commitment device for EMU members to 
undergo reforms and fiscal consolidation as opposed to the existing evidently weak, 
non-enforceable sanctions’ mechanism of the Stability and Growth Pact.   
 
We believe that our proposal meets all four criteria set above for a successful handling 
of the present crisis. By maintaining all debts in strong-euro terms there will be no 
bail-out and no loss of claims to future consumption. The reputation of the EMU as a 
low-inflation area and the credibility of the strong euro as a strong international 
currency will also be preserved. These elements are bound to be attractive to core-
 4 
EMU countries. As such, they will eliminate the basis for tensions within the two-
currency EMU. They will also be beneficial to the European banking sector, whose 
substantial investments in periphery bonds markets will be shielded by the risk of 
default. Periphery EMU countries have plenty to gain too. As the weak euro will stay 
at the hands of the ECB there will be no return to the old bad days of high-
inflation/devaluation vicious circles: the policy-credibility dividend of EMU 
participation will be maintained. At the same time, the devaluation of the weak euro 
will provide them a breathing space allowing their societies a much better chance of 
shouldering the necessary structural reforms. Thus, the chances of periphery 
governments to bring the latter to successful conclusion will be significantly enhanced 
and the door to returning to the strong euro will be open. Furthermore, as our proposal 
respects the “red lines” of both core and periphery EMU countries, there is every 
reason to believe that it will meet the approval of the markets. Finally, our proposal 
will be beneficial for EMU’s enlargement: In the present circumstances, the young 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe cannot realistically expect to join the 
EMU in the foreseeable future. A two-currency EMU will provide them a chance of 
joining the EMU at a reasonably close date, initially as members of the weak euro, 
thus maintaining internal popular support and the momentum of enlargement.  
 
In short, we believe that our proposal has something good to offer to all interested 
parties. Above all, if worse came to worst, it would preserve the EMU project to 
whose long-term economic and political benefits we strongly believe. We very much 
hope that in future months the Eurozone’s outlook will improve to such an extent as 
to render our proposal redundant. But if they do not, we hope that our proposal will be 
noted and considered as what is intended to be, that is an option of last resort.  
 
 
